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DEMOCRATIZING CANDIDATE 
SELECTION 
Causes and Consequences 
Paul Pennings and Reuven Y. Hazan 
ABSTRACT 
This special issue offers an up-to-date overview of the democratization 
of candidate selection, while giving attention to causes and cases from 
both past and present. The focus is on the consequences of internal 
democratization for the overall functioning of political parties. The 
contributions show that there are many forms of democratizing 
candidate selection. These differences mainly concern the inclusiveness 
of the selectorate that controls the candidate selection process and the 
degree of centralization of the selection methods, of which the role and 
composition of the selectorate are the most vital and defining criteria. 
The types of consequences and their impact on the functioning of parties 
are not univocal because there are different degrees of democratization. 
The empirical evidence presented by the contributions shows that 
moderate forms of democratization can have beneficial effects on party 
organizations - such as higher levels of membership participation - but 
that this effect is not certain. Radical forms, on the other hand, are more 
likely to distort party cohesiveness, and consequently weaken the 
quality of representative democracy. 
KEY WORDS _ candidate selection _ intra-party democracy _ party organization _ 
primaries 
In most modern representative democracies, the relationship between the 
party and the voter is weakening. The reasons are mostly related to increas-
ing levels of education and material well-being, which make citizens more 
and more independent from parties, unions and other collective bodies of 
representation (Flanagan and Dalton, 1984; Mair, 1989; Schmitt and 
Holmberg, 1995; Poguntke, 1996). 
The consequences of these trends for political parties are well known. 
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Most parties are confronted with dropping membership rates, which causes 
financial problems and also hampers the recruitment of candidates and the 
party organization as a whole (Daalder, 1992; Scarrow, 1996). Another con-
sequence is that the number of floating voters is growing. The increase in 
electoral volatility causes (potentially) heavy fluctuations in the vote shares 
of parties. This strengthens the vulnerability of the party elites because their 
position increasingly depends on factors they cannot control, such as the 
media's coverage of electoral campaigns, the effects of political scandals, etc. 
(Kleinnijenhuis and De Ridder, 1998). 
These tendencies indicate that parties no longer possess a stable electoral 
base. Parties therefore need to seek new methods of increasing their popu-
larity and of gaining votes in elections. Shifts in party strategy are becom-
ing more and more important for parties if they are to secure and enlarge 
their vote shares (Kaase, 1994; Scarrow, 1999; Wattenberg, 1991). 
Examples of this include the intensification of campaigning prior to elec-
tions, rather than ongoing partisan activities, and the focus on individual 
candidates rather than on the party. 
However, there is another method that parties are adopting in order to 
increase their popularity, a process which is novel and has not received much 
scholarly attention - the democratization of candidate selection. By enlar-
ging the number of those who have a say in the nomination and selection 
of candidates, parties can try to strengthen the sense of involvement of either 
members or voters. This can be done through varying degrees of member-
ship participation, ranging from a mediated indirect party vote to un-
restricted participation. Primaries belong to the unrestricted forms of 
membership participation, in which candidates are chosen by the party 
members ('closed primaries') or by the voters ('open primaries') (Carty and 
Blake, 1999; Hazan, 1997; Rahat and Hazan, in this issue). 
As parties constitute the only apparatus that is in a position to select 
candidates, new forms of democratization have significant effects on the 
functioning of parties and of democracies as a whole. Parties playa double 
role here. On the one hand, they serve an intermediate function by giving 
voters a chance to select a representative. On the other hand, they also want 
to monitor who is selected. The representation of voters is clearly affected 
by the selection of candidates. 
The democratization of candidate selection means that the controlling 
role of an exclusive selectorate diminishes so that more people - i.e. a more 
inclusive selector ate - have a direct say in who is selected and, hence, how 
they are represented. However, the evidence presented in this special issue 
also points in another direction: democratization may also strengthen the 
role of the party elites in the selection of candidates. To what extent and 
under which circumstances these contrasting effects occur varies, and the 
contributions that follow seek to describe and explain these differences. 
The democratization of candidate selection is not a global trend, as there 
are significant differences in the degree to which parties open up their 
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selection procedures (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Norris, 1996). West 
European parties regulate their own candidate selection processes, and 
therefore have a greater chance of keeping the process under control. This 
is in contrast to US primaries, which are open by law, or to Israeli primaries, 
where the two main parties lost control of the process. 
The consequences of the democratization of candidate selection are varied 
because different selectorates (i.e. bodies that select candidates) are likely to 
produce not only different kinds of parliamentary candidates but also differ-
ent types of candidates for the party leadership. The major British, Ameri-
can and Canadian parties tend to have more open selection procedures than 
those common in Western Europe (although some major European parties 
are opening up their procedures, too). The US Democratic Party, the British 
Labour Party and the Canadian Progressive-Conservative Party are 
examples of parties in government that suffered a crushing electoral defeat. 
Those defeats led to considerable tensions within the respective parties and, 
in turn, to a request for party renewal that could lay the foundation for their 
return to power. In each instance, an important component of the argument 
was the need for greater democratization - to open up the party to new 
ideas, new groups and broader participation. But in doing so, the parties 
themselves changed in a number of significant ways and encountered many 
unintended consequences concerning their selection of leaders (LeDuc, in 
this issue). 
Primaries have traditionally been more important in English-speaking 
countries than in Western Europe as a whole. But during the 1990s, forms 
of candidate selection involving internal party elections of various kinds 
have become an increasingly visible feature of Western European party pol-
itics. Examples are found in Denmark (Bille, 1994), Finland (Sundberg, 
1994), Belgium (Deschouwer, 1994), Ireland (Farrell, 1994) and the UK 
(Punnett, 1992). There are, however, also examples of parties that continue 
to centralize the selection of candidates and leaders, such as the Dutch 
parties (Koole, 1994; Krouwel, 1999). In other countries, like Norway, 
attempts to centralize the selection processes have proven unsuccessful 
(Svasand, 1994: 318). Hence, there is a wide variety in candidate selection 
procedures in European countries. This diversity can be explained by refer-
ring to the complex interactions between national laws, intra-party decision-
making and the electoral fortunes of parties. However, the more parties are 
weakened by the loss of members and/or votes, the stronger the incentives 
will be to open up the process of candidate selection. 
The logic of primary elections as observed in the United States suggests 
general patterns not directly applicable to the Western European cases 
because no party has opened up the process to its whole electorate - or is 
likely to do so. The US primaries were introduced in order to give voters a 
choice and to eliminate the manipulation of the presidency by party elites. 
US primary elections are run by state governments, so that parties have no 
direct control over the nomination procedure (Ware, 1996). According to 
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its critics, these primaries suffer from at least three problems: low voter 
turnout; insufficient information on choices; and the weakening of political 
parties (Epstein, 1980; Ranney, 1975). These problems were reinforced by 
the change from caucuslconvention to direct primaries. 
Western European primaries have, up until now, been founded on the 
membership principle, and are therefore different from US-style primaries. 
The European model is more restricted and mediated than the US primary. 
Within Europe there is more experience with the democratization of candi-
date selection than is often assumed. Scandinavia is an obvious example of 
this. In Sweden and Norway, the candidates are ranked as a result of an 
internal process; in Denmark, voters have the alternative of voting for a 
single candidate; and in Finland, the voters - not the party - decide who will 
be elected. As a result, in Sweden and Norway party members have more 
influence than the voters, while in Finland it is the voters who have more 
influence. Denmark seems to be an in-between case (Bille, in this issue). In 
Denmark, the selection of candidates for national elections has always been 
a matter for party members at the constituency/local level. The increasing 
role of the individual member in this process can be seen as an attempt to 
counteract the decline in membership levels, which was especially marked 
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s (Bille, 1994: 144). Within the Euro-
pean context, the Scandinavian tradition of candidate selection appears 
relatively open and decentralized. Its consequences are, however, not com-
parable to those of US primaries. The traditional openness of Scandinavian 
parties is more restricted and its consequences are, therefore, moderate. For 
those parties that seek democratization, but also want to avoid unforeseen 
consequences, the Scandinavian routes are instructive. 
The consequences of democratization for intra-party relationships are 
illustrated by the debate on the cartel party (Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair, 
1994). Since the eighteenth century there has been a professionalization of 
party leadership. As the elite party was replaced by the mass party, and then 
transformed into a catch-all party, the central party elites became more 
important, and also more independent. In the meantime, society has become 
more complex and demanding. As a consequence, politicians have become 
more constrained in what they can deliver, but they also have increasingly 
become professionals, for whom the personal stakes of failure are high. The 
result, according to the Katz and Mair (1995) hypothesis, is the tacit for-
mation of a cartel among the ruling elites. The consequences of this develop-
ment are that real issues are kept off the political agenda, there is a limited 
class of inside participants and rules are used to shut out challengers to this 
new ruling class. These challengers are found mainly among the party 
activists. These activists become less powerful when party decisions are 
made, for example, by direct postal vote of the full membership, rather than 
by the party congress. Hence, when cartel parties open up and allow more 
influence of ordinary members on candidate selection, it would imply a 
strengthening of the party elites and of the cartel party model, which is, in 
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essence, not as democratic as the mass party once was. Democratization of 
the candidate selection process can, therefore, have the unforeseen effect of 
a further cartelization of parties (Katz, in this issue). This is the paradox of 
the democratization of candidate selection: democratization can go hand in 
hand with professionalization and cartelization. But this democratization 
concerns mainly the 'ordinary' members, who are more docile and prepared 
to follow the party leadership than the middle-level elite and the activists 
(Mair, 1994: 16). While this hypothesis has yet to be tested on the basis of 
empirical research in a broad variety of countries, one of the goals of this 
special issue is to examine varieties in the interrelationships between democ-
ratization and cartelization. 
We also seek to take one step ahead and assess the consequences of the 
democratization of candidate selection (Pennings, 2000). In general, poli-
ticians show the greatest loyalty to the locus that has greatest influence on 
their re-election. For this reason, the cohesion of the party is closely related 
to the locus of selection. Party cohesiveness is important because it directly 
affects the quality of the democratic political process. When the decline of 
parties in terms of membership, finances and, incidentally, electoral support 
is countered by an opening up of candidate selection, the reaction seems to 
strengthen the problem instead of solving it, especially when democratiza-
tion takes the form of primaries. The reason is that primaries invoke a direct 
relationship between voters and candidates that can weaken the cohesive-
ness and the intermediary role of the party organs. If candidates are chosen 
directly by voters or members, then the candidates, their views and prefer-
ences, could become more important than the programmatic profile of the 
party as a whole. Hence, the most important consequences are the loosen-
ing of party control over the behavior of its representatives, the changing of 
legislative working patterns and the introduction of both public and extra-
party mediators - rather than the party - as the focal points of interaction. 
But, as stated before, these consequences have not been studied yet for a 
larger range of countries simultaneously - and that is exactly what this 
special issue intends to do. 
The contributions in this special issue demonstrate that radical forms of 
democratizing candidate selection fundamentally alter the relationships 
between the parties and the candidates, between the parties and the voters, 
and between the party representatives and the party leaders. By putting 
candidates in a more independent position vis-a-vis the party and its leader-
ship, primaries have, in several instances, undermined the loyalty of candi-
dates to party policies and led to both a decrease in party cohesiveness and 
instability in legislative behavior. All in all, it is quite clear that the combi-
nation of 'cartelization' and primaries does not automatically lead to more 
democratization. When we look in general terms at the democratization of 
candidate selection for the cohesiveness and impact of parties we often see 
two consequences: First, the more unrestricted voter control becomes, the 
more dramatic and significant the consequences are; second, the negative 
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and unexpected consequences often outweigh the positive ones. These find-
ings are clearly supported by the case study of Israel, for example (Rahat 
and Hazan, in this issue). 
This special issue offers an up-to-date overview of the democratization of 
candidate selection, while giving attention to causes and cases from both 
past and present. The focus is on the consequences of internal democratiz-
ation for the overall functioning of political parties. The articles in this 
special issue also address such questions as: Can parties and candidates find 
a new balance of responsibilities? Is the democratization of candidate selec-
tion truly democratic? Can the opening of candidate selection be a strategy 
of the party leadership to circumvent the party activists by empowering the 
rank and file - and now growing - party membership? Can this process be 
reversed? What are the consequences of intra-party democratization for the 
systemic functioning of democratic regimes? 
In order to present a clearer picture of the causes and consequences of 
democratizing candidate selection, the articles pose the following questions 
and offer a detailed overview and analysis of theoretical, methodological, 
analytical and comparative aspects. 
• What are the implications of the democratization of candidate selection 
for party theory? How is the functioning of parties affected and what are 
the possible implications for the role of parties within modern democra-
cies? Richard Katz deals with these questions by comparing candidate 
selection within different models of party democracy. 
• How do nomination procedures vary across parties and countries, and 
what is the impact of this variation on the nature of the candidates chosen 
and on legislative behavior? This question is addressed by Gideon Rahat 
and Reuven Hazan, who present an analytical framework of selectorates 
and selectoral systems, and assess their influences on competitiveness, rep-
resentativeness, the level of intra-party conflict and legislative behavior. 
• Do different selectorates produce different types of leaders? Lawrence 
LeDuc answers this question by pointing to three parties in different 
majoritarian systems. He reveals major, unforeseen consequences, such as 
the loss of control over the parties' selectorates and the issue of perme-
ability, referring to the possibility that leaders are recruited entirely from 
outside the party. 
• How do primaries function in Western Europe compared to the USA? 
Jonathan Hopkin makes this comparison and gives a detailed analysis of 
the effects of primaries in Spain and the UK. One conclusion is that the 
logic of primary elections is not directly applicable to Western European 
countries. The European model could be described as a mixed, or 
restricted, model of primaries. 
• To what extent have parties used the democratization of candidate selec-
tion as a method of strengthening the relationship between voters and 
parties? Lars Bille examines whether the democratization of candidate 
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selection methods has actually occurred in the West European parties in 
general, and in Denmark in particular, during the period from 1960 to 
1990. In Denmark, for example, the introduction of postal ballots 
increased the role of the individual member and made an already demo-
cratic procedure even more democratic. But, both in Western Europe and 
in Denmark, stability and modest changes are the dominant picture. 
What these contributions do make clear is that there are many forms of 
democratizing candidate selection. These differences mainly concern the 
inclusiveness of the selectorate and the degree of centralization of the selec-
tion methods. Democratization often means adopting more inclusive candi-
date requirements and territorial or functional decentralization. However, 
neither territorial nor functional decentralization is crucial for democratiz-
ation. Instead, the role and composition of the selectorate that controls the 
candidate selection process are the most vital criteria. As long as the more 
important and powerful selectorate continues to be a restricted and small 
party elite, decentralization will not lead to substantial democratization. 
The types of consequences produced by democratizing candidate selec-
tion, and their impact on the functioning of parties, are not univocal because 
there are different degrees of democratization. The empirical evidence pre-
sented in this special issue shows that moderate forms of democratization 
can have beneficial effects on party organizations - such as higher levels of 
membership - but that this effect is far from certain. Radical forms, on the 
other hand, are more likely to distort party cohesiveness, and consequently 
weaken the quality of representative democracy. 
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